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ABSTRACT 
 
The Effects of the State Sector on Wage Inequality in 
Urban China: 1988–2007 
 
This paper examines the effects of state sector domination on wage inequality in urban 
China. Using Chinese Household Income Project surveys, we conduct two exercises: with 
quantile regression analysis, we identify wage gaps across the distribution and over time; and 
we employ the Machado and Mata (2005) decomposition to investigate how urban wage 
inequality was affected by the changes in wage structure and employment share of the state 
sector. We find that since the radical state sector reforms designed to reduce over-staffing 
and improve efficiency since the late 1990s, urban wage gaps were narrowed due to the 
reduction of employment share in the state sector; the wage premium of the state sector in 
comparison with the non-state sector increased significantly; and changes in the wage 
structure of the labour market caused the rise in urban wage inequality. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Although the Chinese economy has been transformed immensely, it is still dominated by the 
state bias towards the public service sector and state-owned enterprises. The bias is indicated 
by the share of state sector employment and related wage setting. In the past decade, there has 
been widespread concern that industrial wage gaps, particularly between the state and non-state 
sectors, have been increasing in China.  
 
Industrial wage differentials could exist even in a perfectly competitive market economy.  This 
may be due to the fact that wages are normally higher in high-tech and capital intensive 
industries than that in low-tech or labour intensive industries ceteris paribus. If the wage gaps 
are substantial under this circumstance, there is no need to directly restrict the pay in the highly 
paid industries instead, the government could tax high salaries and set a minimum wage. China 
is arguably different. The transition of Chinese economy is characterized by a still less well 
functioning market system and strong government intervention. The state-bias has been 
reinforced with a launch of a series of economic policies in China starting from mid 1990s and 
being reinforced since 2002. 
 
State-dominated policies have allowed the Chinese state to monopolize prices, retain 
monopolistic profit and set up higher wage payments to state sector employees than their 
marginal product of labour or market clearing price. In fact, the central government of China 
from 2002 has established tight control of resource allocation, allowing state sector 
monopolization of key economic sectors (finance and banking, transportation and 
communication, and energy sector) and has created the taxation allocation system between 
central and local governments. This has strengthened central control over resource income 
(apart from local land), but left insufficient tax income for local governments. Those economic 
policies have safeguarded the political goals of relentless pursuit of GDP growth and this has 
continued up to the change of party leadership in 2012 (Zhang, 2012).  
 
The aims of this paper are to examine whether state-biased policies have trigged the rise in 
urban wage inequality over time, and whether across the distribution, wage gaps are affected by 
the state sector domination. We begin by providing a brief overview of the change in China’s 
state power. The power of the Chinese state sector has differed in strength since the economic 
reform. Power was decentralized in the first decade of the reforms, but then strengthened and 
made more centralized since the mid-1990s. The relationship between the central government 
and the state sectors affiliated to it during this time may have affected the payment of its 
employees.  
 
Prior to the economic reform, wages were institutionally determined according to a national 
system of grades, scales and seniority, with education and skill receiving little reward (Knight 
and Song, 1993, pp. 221–239; Zhang et al. 2005). From 1981, and in particular after 1986, the 
Chinese government allowed state owned enterprises (SOEs) to implement flexible pay 
schemes according to their profitability (Dai, 1994). Although initially the floating pay or 
bonus was not allowed to be more than 5% of an SOE’s total wage expenditure, this limit was 
gradually abolished (Meng, 2000, p. 83). The SOE reform of 1986 allowed larger pay 
differentials within each SOE, but it was difficult to monitor workers’ productivity; therefore, 
floating wages or bonuses were distributed equally among workers (Meng, 2000, p. 83). 
Because of the soft budget constraints and no requirement to accept business risk, the objective 
of SOE managers was not maximization of profits but maximization of the welfare of SOE 
workers in terms of wages and bonuses. Sometimes, bank loans were used to pay large bonuses 
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when the SOE made a loss (Walder, 1987, 1989). In fact, the SOE managers were also 
incentivized to raise the pay for their workers because the Chinese government had been 
restricted the pay gap between the SOE managers and SOE workers. The government decreed 
that the pay gap between the SOE managers and the average wages of SOE workers be not 
more than 2-3 fold even for those profit-making SOEs in the period from 1986 to 1992 (Chen et 
al. 2005). Based on 1985–1992 firm data, Meng (2000, p. 107) found that retained profits were 
the main determinant of wages in SOEs, whereas in private firms, it was the productivity of 
workers that determined pay. Therefore, with the exception of frequent increases in bonuses 
and subsidies of all types,1 the wage-setting mechanism of SOEs was broadly unchanged until 
the late 1990s when the radical SOE reform was implemented.  
 
After Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in 1992, China’s reform and marketization accelerated. A 
series of reform measures were carried out, such as abolishing the double-tract price system,2 
unifying the tax regime and tightening credit. The most radical reform was the mass 
retrenchment of superfluous workers and retaining larger SOEs while disbanding smaller ones. 
There had been serious over-manning and efficiency problems in the SOE sector; were it not 
for the bank loans and financial subsidies from the state budget, many SOEs would have long 
been bankrupt.3 The implementation of the new reform measures exacerbated the difficulties 
encountered by those loss-making SOEs; for example, SOEs had to pay market prices for key 
resources, faced the same value-added taxes as non-state firms, and could not rely on bank 
loans to pay bonuses and other subsidies to their workers. Confronted with the ever-increasing 
number of loss-making SOEs and an ever-rising heavy budget burden caused by subsidizing 
SOEs, the Chinese government determined to reform the 120 thousand strong SOEs. The SOE 
reform was trialed in 1994 and finally implemented in 1997. A consequence of this was that the 
number of retrenched SOE workers reached 28 million, accounting for half of the SOE 
workforce (State Council News Office, 2004), and the number of SOEs was reduced (by 74%) 
from 120 thousand in the mid-1990s to 32 thousand in 2004 (Naughton, 2007, p. 313). A key 
part of China’s SOE reform was to transform the remaining SOEs, which are profitable and 
monopolistic with strategic importance for the country’s economy, into modern 
market-oriented enterprises. The reform and restructure of SOEs was followed by soaring 
wages and bonuses in the SOE sector (see Tables 1-3). Even in the period of mass 
retrenchment, there was a pay rise for those still-employed SOE workers (Appleton et al. 2005; 
Bai et al. 2006). SCDR (2007) reported that the pay gap between the monopolistic SOEs and 
other enterprises has been increased largely in the period of 1990-2005.  
 
The creation of a State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) in June of 
2003 marked a significant change over the state administration of SOEs. One of the major 
changes is the total wages and salaries contract regime, by which in each year SASAC will 
negotiate with each of the centrally-controlled SOEs over the amount of wages and salaries for 
next year.  The total wages and salaries contract regime effectively restrains wage costs and 
unreasonable pay rises of SOE workers. However, SOEs are reluctant to employ new workers 
because of the constraint on total wages and salaries. This is one the reason why the 
employment share of SOEs further been reduced in the period from 2002 to 2007. SOEs own 
                                                        
1 The share of bonuses in the annual earnings of SOE workers increased from 2.4% in 1978 to 23.3% in 1993, and that of all 
other subsidies rose from 6.5% to 25.1% in the same period (Meng, 2000, pp. 84). 
2 After having produced what the state demanded according to the planned prices, SOEs can sell their products on market 
according to market price; likewise, after having sold the planned quantity of grain to the state at the state procurement price, 
the rural household can trade their agricultural products on free market. 
3 Roughly 40% of the large and middle-sized SOEs were making loss in 1991 (Zhu Rongji, 2011, Vol. 1, pp. 15), the number of 
loss-making SOEs accounted 43% of them and the total losses reached RMB 88.3 billion in 1995 (Zhou, 1996), in the middle 
of 1990s on the whole the middle and small sized SOEs were making loss (Naughton, 2007, pp. 302), in 1996 the share of 
SOEs’ profit in China’s GDP is almost zero (Naughton, 2007, pp. 304).   
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almost the whole of the assets of the country and this asset base has been increasing all the 
time, despite the shrinking employment share. Additionally, the implementation of an annual 
salary system for managerial staff in the SOEs has resulted in the enlargement of pay gap 
within SOEs, for instance, the annual compensation for SOE managers is 9-10 times higher 
than the average annual wages of SOE workers (Liao et al. 2006; Bai, 2008), and Chen et al. 
(2005) found that the position-related consumption of SOE managers was more than ten times 
their annual salary.  
 
As for the public service sector, the 1993 reform of pay rules for civil servants allowed regions 
to set up their own extra-pay scheme, which related the rise in salaries of regional civil servants 
to local economic growth. In other words, the reform sanctioned an arrangement under which 
provincial governments could set the salaries for their own civil servants according to their 
own budgets. Since then, pay differentials for civil servants have gradually been getting larger 
between provinces or between government agencies in the same region (Dai et al., 2005; Liu, 
2006). In the period from 1998-2002 the pay for civil servants and other public sector workers 
had been raised three times (Zhu Rongji, 2011, vol. 4, p. 482). Furthermore, the pay for civil 
servants is higher than that in SOEs, collective enterprises and private firms (Dai et al., 2005). 
It was for these reasons that Jinglian Wu (2006), argued that the main causes of the rapid 
growth in income inequality in China were corruption and monopolistic state-owned 
industries. 
 
We therefore hypothesize that the high pay in the public sector and monopolistic SOEs is one 
of the forces responsible for the increase in the urban wage gap. To test this hypothesis, we 
employ the 1988, 1995, 2002 and 2007 China Household Income Project (CHIP) urban 
household survey data, and Machado and Mata’s (2005) parameterized counterfactual 
decomposition method based on multiple quantile regressions to identify the effect of the 
change in pay structure and employment shares in the public sector and SOEs on urban wage 
inequality. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the data and 
econometric methods. Sections 3 and 4 give the regression results and decomposition of wage 
income inequality respectively. Section 5 presents the summary and conclusions. 
 
2. Data and Methods 
 
2.1 Data 
 
We use urban household survey data from the China Household Income Project (known as 
CHIP data) for 1988, 1995, 2002 and 2007 The survey samples were randomly selected from 
the larger annual national household survey conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics. 
The subsamples cover 10 out of 31 provinces in 1988, 11 in 1995, 12 in 2002 and 9 in 2007. 
The questionnaires were designed by a team of international scholars and obtained more 
detailed information than those in the official household surveys, particularly with respect to 
the measurement of income and labour issues.  
 
For the cross-sectional analysis, we construct a real wage variable covering bonuses, 
income-in-kind, and price subsidies, regional allowances and income from second jobs.4 With 
                                                        
4 Our wage variable, although fairly comprehensive, does exclude some non-monetary benefits such as pension accruals, 
health insurance and housing. The contributions of these variables may vary under differing forms of ownership and over time. 
Nominal wages were converted into real wages by deflating by regional urban CPIs. 
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respect to differential costs of living over time and between regions, we adjusted all wage 
incomes of all years based on urban consumer price indices published by China’s National 
Statistical Bureau, and using 2002 prices as constant. Results from these surveys are in Griffin 
and Zhao (1993), Riskin et al. (2001), Li and Sato (2006) and Gustafsson et al. (2008). 
 
Our analysis in this paper covers households with urban registration (hukou). The reasons to 
exclude rural–urban migrant households are as the following: first, there were no 
systematically conducted rural-urban migrant household surveys conducted in 1988 and 1995; 
the lack of earlier data of migrant households could not serve the comparative purpose set in 
this paper, although this omission has increased over time with the sharp increase in rural–
urban migration during the sample period. Second, in estimating the wage functions of 
workers, urban and rural-urban migrant workers do not share the same characteristics, in 
particular, a large proportion of migrant labour force in urban area are self-employed, or 
engaged in the informal jobs with no regular wage income. If we only draw those who are wage 
earners from migrant surveys and combined them with the urban labour force, the sub-sample 
of migrant wage earners could be subject to sample selection bias. Most importantly, our goal 
in this paper is to investigate the determinants of wage inequality highlighting the effects of 
ownership and industrial sectors over time. Therefore confining our analysis to the 
subpopulation holding urban hukou allows us to examine the institutional causes which have 
increased urban wage inequality over the period of 20 years.  
 
 
2.2 Methods 
 
We employ the quantile regression method to estimate the extended Mincerian earnings 
function (Mincer, 1973). Let Qθ(wit|Xit) for θ∈(0,1) denote the θth quantile of (log) wages w of 
an individual i in year t for given explanatory variables, X. For each year, we model these 
conditional quantiles separately by: 
 
( ) 'ln ( )it it it tQ W X Xθ β θ= , (1) 
 
where β(θ) is a vector of quantile coefficients, and X is a vector of explanatory variables. The 
coefficients are estimated following Koenker and Bassett’s (1978) quantile regression 
estimator. In practice, we run 19 quantile regressions (from quantile points 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, …, 
0.95) for each of the four rounds of cross-sectional data.5 Afterward, we plot a curve for the 19 
coefficients on the dummy variable (with 1 indicating a worker employed by the state sector 
and 0 by the non-state sector) against the 19 quantile points of the wage distribution for each 
year. From these curves we can observe the wage premium of the state sector versus the 
non-state sector across the entire wage distribution over time. 
 
The quantile regression has a number of advantages over conventional ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions. Most importantly, it provides a complete representation of the conditional 
distribution of wages whereas the conventional regression focuses only on the conditional 
mean.6 This is particularly crucial for understanding inequality because a standard regression 
focuses only on central tendency. Furthermore, the quantile approach makes it possible to test 
whether the effects of some determinants of wages on workers higher up in the conditional 
                                                        
5 The distance between any two quantile points is 0.05. 
6 Other advantages of the quantile approach are that it is less sensitive to outliers, more robust to departures from normality 
(Koenker and Bassett, 1978) and has better properties in the presence of heteroscedasticity (Deaton, 1992). 
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wage distribution are different from the effects on those lower down. For this, we can examine 
whether the wage premium of the state sector varies at different points of the conditional wage 
distribution. The quantile approach recognizes the unobserved heterogeneity of workers and 
thus generates a richer picture of the determinants of wages. 
 
Quantile regressions are far from perfect. Outliers and skewed distributions (often observed in 
large-scale cross-section household survey data) make quantile regression residuals deviate 
from the independent and identical distribution (i.i.d.) assumption. If the i.i.d. assumption for 
the regression residuals no longer held, the statistical inference from the regression results 
would be invalid (Hao and Naiman, 2007, pp. 44–47). To circumvent this technical difficulty, 
the bootstrap method is applied to the quantile regressions (Kocherginsky et al., 2005). As 
bootstrap quantile regressions do not need the i.i.d. assumption, they are more robust and 
practical. For this reason, bootstrap quantile regressions are employed in this paper.  
 
Some care must be taken in interpreting the results of the quantile analysis, because they 
pertain to conditional quantiles, not unconditional ones. Thus, a worker at a high-wage quantile 
would be one who receives high wages relative to his/her values of the observed determinants 
of wages, X, rather than simply a high-wage worker per se. Another way of saying this is that a 
worker at a high-wage quantile will tend to have favorable unobserved determinants of wages. 
This shows the difficulty in interpreting the results. As some determinants of wages are 
unobserved, it is not clear exactly what they are. They could include measurement error, for 
example, or random factors (a worker’s good fortune in chancing upon a high-paying position). 
However, there is some interest in these unobservables; for example, unobserved personal 
characteristics affecting earnings are often labeled “ability” in the theoretical literature 
(although they may also encompass determination, ambition and factors such as personal 
appearance). Unobserved characteristics of a job may also be interesting; for example, we do 
not observe firm size or profitability, but rent-sharing theories imply these may have significant 
effects on earnings. In our exposition, for brevity, when describing the patterns in our findings, 
we often refer to high quantiles unconditionally as representing high-wage workers—as is 
common in the applied literature; however, this is an oversimplification and a more nuanced 
interpretation focusing on unobservables is often invoked when trying to explain our results.  
 
One of our main purposes of using quantile regressions is to study the evolution of pay 
differentials between the state and non-state sectors for the period from 1988 to 2007. To this 
end, we control for the variables that apply across all four years of CHIP urban household 
survey data in the earnings function (1). In detail, these variables are workers’ schooling, 
experience and experience squared, dummy variables for sex, Communist Party membership, 
non-Han Chinese ethnicity, job characteristics in terms of occupations and industrial sectors, 
and provincial dummies. The variable of interest in this paper is a dummy variable identifying 
a worker’s employer with 1 indicating the state sector and 0 the non-state sector. 
 
The focus of this paper is on exploring the effect of the state sector’s wage structure and 
employment share on urban wage inequality for the period from 1988 to 2007. For this reason, 
we employ Machado and Mata’s (2005) method (MM method hereafter) to decompose 
changes in wage inequality into changes attributable to two sources. One is the change in wage 
structure in terms of the coefficients on the various explanatory variables. The other is the 
change in the distribution of explanatory variables, i.e., the change in workers’ personal and 
productive characteristics, and in job characteristics. In detail, following Machado and Mata 
(2005), if a(.) are summary statistics for wages—such as the Gini coefficient—then we can 
decompose the changes in a as follows: 
8 
 
 
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
coefficients
covariate
   (1) (0)
* (1); (0) * (0)
  * (1) * (1); (0) .
f w f w
f w X f w
f w f w X residual
a a
a a
a a
−
 = − + 
 − + 
 (2) 
 
where f(w(t)) denotes the estimator of the marginal density of w (the log wage) at t based on the 
observed sample {wi(t)}, f*(w(t)) denotes the estimator of density of w at t based on the 
generated sample {wi*(t)}, and t = 0, 1. The counterfactual densities are denoted by f*(w(1); 
X(0)), for the density that would result in t = 1 if all covariates had their t = 0 distributions, 
f*(w(1); Xi(0)), for the wage density in t = 1 if only Xi (part of the covariates) were distributed 
as in t = 0. 
 
Furthermore, the contribution of an individual covariate xi to the total wage inequality could be 
measured by looking at indicators such as: 
 
( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )* *1 1 ; 0if w f w xa a− . (3) 
 
Along the lines of MM method, we are able to counterfactually measure the contribution of an 
individual coefficient βi to the change in wage inequality by observing:  
 
( )( ) ( )( )* (0); (1) * (0)if w f wa β a− , (4) 
 
where ( )* (0); (1)if w β  denotes the estimator of the density of w with all covariates at period 0 
and all coefficients, apart from βi(1), from period 0; βi(1) denotes the coefficient of xi from 
period 1. With formula (4), we then counterfactually analyze the change in the wage inequality 
and wage gap caused by specific changes in the pay structure, such as changes in the returns to 
education. 
 
In essence, Machado and Mata’s counterfactual decomposition is an extension of Oaxaca’s 
(1973) decomposition for quantile regressions.7 A key exercise of the MM method is to obtain 
the generated sample {wi*(t)}. To obtain {wi*(t)}, one first needs to estimate n quantile 
regression coefficients ˆ ( )t iβ θ  (where θi denotes the quantile point), and then generate a 
random sample of size n with replacement from the rows of X(t) denoted by * 1{ }
n
i tx = , and finally 
get * * ' 1ˆ{ ( ) ( ) ( )}
t n
i i i tw t x t β θ == .
8 For details, the reader is referred to Machado and Mata (2005). 
 
Finally, because China’s economic transition has occurred gradually, the counterfactual 
decomposition is implemented period by period. In detail, these periods are 1988–1995, 1995–
2002 and 2002–2007, based on the availability of the CHIP data. The same explanatory 
variables were applied in all the four years’ earning functions. 
                                                        
7 As is well known, there is a potential index number problem with such exercises. 
8 According to Machado and Mata (2005), one needs to randomly draw θi of sample size n from θ[0, 1]. However, in practice, 
we only take 999 quantile points with equal distance from the uniform distribution on [0, 1] by following Albrecht et al. (2003) 
and Rica et al. (2008). In other words, we estimated 999 quantile regressions for quantile points 0.001, 0.002, 0.003, …, 0.999 
on [0, 1] for the earnings function for each of the four years.  
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3. Results from Quantile Regressions 
 
3.1 Wage gaps between the state and non-state sectors 
 
The change of urban wage over time is reported in Table 1. The Gini coefficient of urban wage 
income increased sharply from 0.237 in 1988 to 0.345 in 1995, and remained unchanged in 
2002, but rose to 0.439 in 2007. The Lorenz curves of wage income during these four years 
show the same trend (Figure 1). The 90/10 wage ratio increased sharply from 2.82 in 1988 to 
6.43 in 2007. The wage gaps in the non-state sector are larger than those in the state sector 
(public service sector and SOEs), but the difference between them is diminishing (Table 2). 
Finally, the wage gaps within each sector and each subsector increased continuously during 
this period.  
 
Figure 2 exhibits raw (unconditional) daily wage gap curves between the state sector 
(comprising the public service sector and SOEs) and the non-state sector based on percentile 
points, ranged from low to high. In general, pay in the state sector is higher than in the non-state 
sector. In 1988, for the 10th percentile point, the wage in the state sector is 1.5 times that in the 
non-state sector, but this ratio decreases to 1.1 for the 90th percentile point. In 1995, the inverse 
relationship between the wage gap of the state and non-state sectors and the wage level 
strengthened. The ratio of wages in the state and non-state sectors for the 10th and 90th 
percentiles increased to 1.9 and 1.2 respectively. Although the state sector still paid more than 
the non-state sector in 2002, the gap is smaller than that for 1995 below the 35th percentile of 
the wage distribution, whereas the wage gaps for these two years above the 35th percentile are 
roughly the same. In 2007, the wage gap between the state and non-state sectors is close to that 
for 1988 in the lower part of the wage distribution and close to that for 2002 in the rest of the 
wage distribution.  
 
3.2 Wage gaps within the state sector of China 
 
Another trend worth discussing is the change in wage gaps within the state sector over time and 
cross the distribution. In this paper, the state sector consists of two subsectors: public service 
sector and the state owned enterprises. The former covers government offices and state-funded 
institutions such as schools, universities, hospitals, etc. The latter is the SOE sector. Therefore, 
before examining the wage gap between the state sector and non-state sector, it is necessary to 
investigate the pay differential between the public sector and SOEs.  
 
As a result of mass retrenchment within the state sector since 1990s, the share of employment in 
the public service sector rose from 30% in 1995 to 32% in 2007, whereas that in the SOEs fell 
sharply from 51% in 1995 to 34% in 2002 and further to 18% in 2007 (Table 4). When the labour 
force within the state production was reduced while that in the service sector was not affected, 
would this affect wage inequality with the state sector? To be specific, within the state sector, 
were wages was more equally distributed between the two types of employees? What was the 
trend of wage distribution within the state sector during the reform decades?  
 
To determine whether there is any pay differential between the public sector and SOEs, we 
employ CHIP urban household survey data for 1995, 2002 and 2007 in which the public sector 
and SOEs can be identified by exploring the pay gap between these two subsectors.9 The OLS 
                                                        
9 The ownership variables include public sector, collective enterprise, foreign-owned and joint-venture enterprises, private 
sector and others with SOEs as the reference variable. Other variables such as workers’ sex, Communist Party membership, 
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regression results reveal that the pay in the public service sector was 8% higher than that in SOEs 
in 1995; however, this pay gap drops to 5% in 2002, and to –2% in 2007 although it is statistically 
insignificant. During this period, one important policy initiated which might have altered the 
wage distribution between the two sub-sectors. A more centralized budgeting system was 
launched in 1994, under which the cost for teachers, medical service workers and all public 
service sector workers are funded by the central government budgetary system. Among those paid 
by the central public budgets include the very low paid country-side teachers and those state 
CEOs of SOES whose annual payments could reach millions.   
 
Figure 3 plots the premium paid to public service workers over those in SOEs. In 1995, the 
premium is positive, but generally falls in size as we move up the conditional wage distribution 
(the exception is the spike at the 95th percentile). In 2002, there is a similar pattern except that the 
gap falls so much that it becomes negative and for the top 23 percentiles, SOE workers are paid 
more than public sector workers. In 2007, the pay in the public service sector is generally lower 
than that in SOEs except for the top 23 percentiles which are higher than that of 2002 level. This 
indicates that SOE workers are better paid than those in the public service sector for but the top 
quintile. There is thus a reversal payment structure between the two subsamples between the early 
period and the year of 2007. After 2002, state owned enterprises paid higher wages to most of 
their workers than did the public service sector, the exceptions being at the top end of the 
distribution. 
 
3.3 Evolution of the wage premium of state sector versus non-state sector 
 
Figure 4 presents the evolution of the wage premium curves for the state sector over the non-state 
sector. For 1988, the wage premium decreases as the conditional wage level increases, with the 
largest premium of 24% occurring at the fifth percentile of the wage distribution, 14% at the 
median percentile and 8% at the 95th percentile. These results are reinforced by 1995 data, in that 
the wage premiums of the state sector versus non-state sector at the fifth, median and 95th 
percentiles of the wage distribution were 34%, 24% and 17%, respectively. This raises several 
questions. What caused the pay of the state sector to be significantly higher than that of non-state 
sector in 1988 and 1995? Why was this wage premium further raised in 1995 compared with 1988? 
And finally, why does the wage premium fall as the wage level increased? 
 
The history of SOE reform might shed light on the above questions. The Chinese government 
started allowing SOEs to implement flexible pay schemes according to their profitability in the 
early 1980s. The objective of SOE managers was not maximization of profits but maximization of 
the welfare of SOE workers in terms of wages and bonuses, because there are the soft budget 
constraints and no requirement of bearing business risk and that the pay gap between a SOE 
managers and the average SOE worker should not be more than 2-3 fold. Additionally, retained 
profits were the main determinant of wages in SOEs, whereas in private firms, it was the 
productivity of workers that determined pay. Therefore, with the exception of frequent increases 
in bonuses and subsidies of all types, the wage-setting mechanism of SOEs was broadly 
unchanged until the late 1990s when the radical SOE reform was implemented. This problem, 
which resulted from poor institutional design, meant that the pay in SOEs was higher than that in 
private firms and that the magnitude of this pay differential increased in the period from 1988 to 
1995. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
ethnicity, occupation, industrial sectors, provincial dummies are the control variables.  
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Floating wages or bonuses, which were permitted since the early 1980s, were distributed equally 
among workers within each SOE because of the difficulty to monitor workers’ productivity. By 
contrast, the wage of a worker in a private firm was determined by his/her marginal product. 
Therefore, we expect that wage inequalities will be much larger in private firms than in SOEs, 
which this study confirms (Tables 2 and 3). Pay in SOEs is reasonably equally distributed among 
workers, whereas wage inequalities in private firms are large, which accounts for the wage 
premium of the state sector being larger than that of the non-state sector in the lower part of the 
wage distribution and smaller in the upper part. Chamberlin (1994) found that the wage premium 
of trade union members is higher in the lower part of the wage distribution. This suggests that the 
SOEs in China played a similar role to that of trade unions in the US in terms of wage negotiations; 
that is, the SOEs are more effective in protecting lower-wage workers. 
 
Because of the change in political atmosphere after 1992, China’s reform and marketization 
accelerated. The radical SOE reform resulted in a sharp fall of the employment share of SOE 
sector and less but strengthened those SOEs that were profitable and monopolistic with strategic 
importance for the country’s economy. Other reform measures also have had a significant impact 
on SOEs, such as abolishing the dual pricing system forced SOEs to pay market prices for key 
resources, unifying the tax regime caused SOEs to pay the same value-added taxes as other 
non-state firms, and tightening credit deprived SOEs of using bank loans to pay bonuses and other 
subsidies to their workers. Despite of these reform measures, surviving non-retrenched SOE 
workers shared the profits brought about by the improved efficiency of SOEs and public service 
workers enjoyed pay rise three times for the period from 1997 to 2002, as discussed in Sections of 
this paper. What effect did these reforms have on the wage-setting mechanism of SOEs? Figure 4 
shows that the wage premium of the state sector versus the non-state sector declined to 1988 
levels (in the first quintile and the fourth quartile, the premium was even less than that in 1988), 
and hence was much lower than that in 1995. What factors caused the 2002 wage premium to be 
so far below the 1995 level? After the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, the Chinese 
economy experienced deflation until around 2002. Additionally, the urban labour market was 
heavily flooded by the roughly 30 million retrenched SOE workers and the almost 100 million 
rural-urban migrants.10 Therefore, there existed no wage inflation pressure in the private sector.11 
Any pay rises in the private sector were a consequence of productivity change that might be 
resulted from the unprecedented large-scale inflow of FDI12 and the improved competiveness of 
urban labor market.13 In summary, the fall of the wage premium of the state sector in 2002 
relative to 1995 could only be the result of significant pay rises in the non-state sector during this 
period. 
 
In 2007, the wage premium of the state sector was still less than that of 1988 over the first quintile 
of the wage distribution. However, for the second to fifth quintiles, the wage premium of the state 
sector for 2007 was higher than that in both 1988 and 2002, but lower than that in 1995. 
                                                        
10 The number of rural-urban migrants dramatically soared from 15 million in 1990 to 98 million in 2003 (News Office of the 
State Council, 2004), and further to 145 million in 2009 (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, 2010). The reform 
of financial and banking sector aimed at solving bad loans resulted in sharp reduction of financial supports to rural industrial 
activities and hence large-scale closure of rural industrial enterprises, which in turn forced rural surplus labourers migrating to 
urban areas for employment (Huang, 2008). 
11 In contrast to the shrinking of the SOE sector, non-state sectors are significantly expanding. For example, the share of 
employment in urban areas created by the non-state sectors rose from 26% in 1992 to 68% in 2001 and further to 78% in 2007 
even without accounting for jobs being brought about by the rural-urban migrants (NSB, 1993, 2002 and 2008). 
12 Attracted by the huge market, cheap labour and high economic growth rate, tremendous amount of foreign direct investment 
flows to China so that China replaced America as the top recipient of FDI in 2003 (53 billion US dollars, OECD, 2004), the 
figure climbing to 90 billion US dollars in 2009 (Wen, 2010). The foreign-owned enterprises paid the much higher wages than 
domestic ones to recruit highly skilled and motivated workers (Appleton, et al. 2005; Xia et al, 2009). 
13 At the turn of the century, China’s labor market had become more competitive than in the late 1980s. 
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Furthermore, the wage premium of the state sector for 2007 is close to constant for the middle 50% 
of the wage distribution. However, for the fourth quartile, the wage premium of the state sector for 
2007 decreases as the wage level increases. In general, the wage premium of the state sector 
increased significantly during the period from 2002 to 2007. What factors could have led to this 
result? The operating environment of the SOEs changed dramatically after 2002 with the 
completion of the abovementioned radical SOE reforms. The remaining SOEs were profitable 
and monopolistic with strategic importance to the country, such as banks, financial firms, 
telecoms, and aviation, railway and energy enterprises. According to the National Statistical 
Bureau, the growth rates of wages in the SOE sector and non-state sector were 14.12% and 
12.76%, respectively, during the period from 2002 to 2009, and the SOEs’ wage premium relative 
to non-state firms increased from 0.30% in 2002 to 10.36% in 2009.14 Therefore, Wu (2006) 
speculated that the expanding wage inequality was caused by the monopolistic SOEs and 
corruption; Gu and Feng (2008), Yue et al. (2010) and Jia (2011), among others, also found that 
the pay gap between monopolistic SOEs and other enterprises is unacceptable. 
 
3.3 Reasonable and unreasonable components of the wage premium of the state sector 
versus non-state sector 
 
Following Yue et al. (2010), we also explore the extent to which the wage premium of the state 
sector versus non-state sector is reasonable. We estimate Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition15  on 
the dummy variable of being employed in the state sector in the extended Mincerian earnings 
function of this paper for the four rounds of the CHIP urban household survey. The purpose of 
this is to measure reasonable and unreasonable components of the wage premium of the state 
sector versus non-state sector.  
 
The Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition based on OLS regressions shows that the unreasonable 
part of the wage premium of the state sector versus non-state sector was in the range of 43–44% 
for the years 1988, 1995 and 2002, but that it climbed to 81% in 2007 (Table 5). Nevertheless, 
the unreasonable part of the wage premium of the state sector had been kept at roughly the 
same level for the period from 1988 to 2002 but shot up sharply in 2007. Yue at al. (2010) 
found that the unreasonable part of the wage premium of the monopolistic SOEs versus 
non-monopolistic firms is as high as 60%.16 Recall that the wage premium of the public service 
sector versus SOEs decreased as the wage level increased in 1995 and 2002, whereas in 2007 
the opposite occurs. As mentioned above, after the reforms, the remaining SOEs were 
profitable and monopolistic. These monopolistic SOEs could obtain favorable treatment from 
various government agencies and banks (such as easy credit, lower taxes, right to control 
                                                        
14 The pay gap between the average wages of SOEs and the non-state sector calculated from the NSB report is somewhat 
different from that derived using the CHIP urban household surveys. The latter was based on randomly sampled urban 
household survey data. Therefore, it is closer to reality.  
15 In this paper, the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition based on OLS regression and the multiple quantile regression is conducted 
using the downloadable STATA procedure “decomp”. The STATA procedure “decomp” was written by Ian Watson, who 
closely follows Blinder’s exposition and uses both his method and his terminology. We adopt the “decomp” procedure because 
it suits our objective. In the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition of the pay gap between the state sector and non-state sector in this 
study, the wage structure of the non-state sector is decided by market competition, whereas the nonmarket factors play 
significant roles in the pay setting of the state sector. For example, in the state sector, a worker’s political affiliation is an 
important determinant of earnings. In the monopolistic SOEs, monopolistic profit may increase the pay of the workers. 
Therefore, the wage premium of the state sector versus non-state sector is the result of positive discrimination. Thus, in the 
process of the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition, the regression coefficients of the earnings function for the non-state sector 
should be set as the reference, and the characteristics of the state sector workers should be the weights in calculating the 
unexplained (or unreasonable) part of the wage premium of the state sector versus non-state sector. The reverse decomposition 
of the “decomp” procedure is required in this study.  
16 Because rural–urban migrants are covered in the CHIP urban household survey, we use Yue et al.’s (2010) Oaxaca–Blinder 
decomposition of the pay gap of monopolistic SOEs and others when the rural–urban sample are excluded.  
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scarce resources), set monopolistic prices, harvest monopolistic profits and hence pay their 
workers’ wages well above market prices. This could be the main factor that boosted the 
unreasonable part of the wage premium of the state sector versus non-state sector. 
 
 
4. Counterfactual Analysis: Effect of the Wage Structure and Employment Share of 
the State Sector on Urban Wage Inequality 
 
Having presented the wage gaps between the state sector and non-state sector and its evolution 
during the period from 1988 to 2007, we now provide findings revealing how urban wage 
inequality was affected by the change in the wage structure and employment share of the state 
sector (encompassing both the public service sector and SOEs). In so doing, we test our key 
hypothesis whether the high pay in the public service sector and SOEs have caused the rise in 
urban wage inequality. As stated in Section 2, the change in wage income inequality can be 
counterfactually decomposed by the change in the wage structure (the change in regression 
coefficients of the earnings function) and the change in workers’ characteristics (the 
explanatory variables of the earnings function). Through this counterfactual decomposition, we 
can observe how the wage inequality was influenced by change in any part of the wage 
structure (any coefficient or any group of coefficients of the earnings function) or any 
explanatory variables. Here we focus on how the urban wage inequality was affected by the 
change in the state sector wage premium (regression coefficient of the dummy variable “state 
sector”) and the change in the employment share of the state sector. 
 
For this exercise, we show how the Gini coefficient and various percentile ratios of the wage 
distribution. Table 6 reports how these were affected by the change in the regression coefficient 
of the state sector dummy, holding all other regression coefficients and all explanatory 
variables unchanged. Table 7 provides corresponding information on the impact of the change 
in employment share of the state sector, holding all other explanatory variables and all 
regression coefficients unchanged. The percentile ratios of the wage distribution presented are 
90/10, 75/25, 90/50 and 50/10. We carried out 10 rounds of counterfactual simulation and then 
averaged the results to give the indicators presented in the tables. The purpose of this averaging 
was to avoid the results being unduly affected by a single simulation result. In each round of the 
counterfactual simulation, we randomly selected 999 observations of the explanatory variables 
from the data for any particular year.  
 
4.1 The effects of the regression coefficient of the state sector on urban wage inequality 
and wage gap 
 
The effects of the regression coefficient of the state sector on urban wage inequality and wage 
premium are different in each transitional period of the Chinese economy. Compared with 
1988, the sharp rise in the wage premium of the state sector versus non-state sector over the 
entire wage distribution (Figure 4) in 1995 resulted in an increase in urban wage inequality 
(Tables 6 and 7). For example, the Gini coefficient increased by 0.007 (if the MM 
decomposition is based on the 1988 wage structure and explanatory variables) or by 0.003 (if 
the decomposition is based on the 1995 wage structure and explanatory variables). The wage 
gap indicators such as the 90/10, 75/25 and 50/10 wage ratios also increased. However, the 
increase in wage gaps was asymmetric because the 50/10 indicator increased while the 90/50 
indicator remained largely unchanged. This implies that the wage gap for workers with wages 
below the median level increased whereas the gap for workers above the median wage level 
was largely unaffected.  
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The mass retrenchment of SOE workers commenced in 1995 and was complete by 2002. 
Compared with 1995, the fall in the wage premium of the state sector versus non-state sector in 
2002 resulted in a fall in urban wage inequality. For instance, the Gini coefficient fell by about 
0.013 (by 0.012 if the MM decomposition is based on the 1995 wage structure and explanatory 
variables, or by 0.014 if the decomposition is based on the 2002 wage structure and explanatory 
variables). The wage gap (in terms of 90/10, 75/25 and 90/50) also declined. Nevertheless, the 
fall in the wage gap for workers in the upper half of the wage distribution is larger than that for 
workers in the lower half.  
 
During the period from 2002 to 2007, the remaining large monopolistic SOEs seized 
opportunities and achieved rapid growth, large monopolistic profits and steady pay rises for 
their employees, particularly their managerial staff. Consequently, the clear rise in the wage 
premium of the state sector versus non-state sector in the upper half of the wage distribution in 
this period caused an increase in urban wage inequality. The Gini coefficient increased by 
0.003 (if the MM decomposition is based on the 2002 wage structure and explanatory 
variables) or by 0.002 (if the decomposition is based on the 2007 wage structure and 
explanatory variables). The wage gap indicators of 90/10, 75/25, 90/50 and 50/10 all increases, 
although high-wage earners received proportionately larger pay rises than low-wage earners.  
 
4.2 The effects of the employment share of the state sector on urban wage inequality 
and wage gap 
 
The MM counterfactual decomposition of the effect of the state sector premium is robust to 
whether beginning years or closing years are used as the reference points. By contrast, 
decompositions of the effect of the change in the employment share of the state sector are 
sensitive to the choice of reference year, particularly for the last two of the three periods (see 
Tables 6 and 7). For the period from 1988 to 1995, the employment share of the state sector 
remained largely unchanged so that the inconsistency is not apparent. However, the 
employment share of the state sector declined from 79% in 1995 to 65% in 2002 and further to 
49% in 2007. If the counterfactual decomposition is based on the beginning year of the two 
periods from 1995 to 2002 and 2002 to 2007, the reduction in the employment share of the state 
sector results in a reduction in urban wage inequality using the Gini coefficient and urban wage 
gap in terms of 90/10 and 50/10. However, if it is based on the closing year of the two periods, 
the fall in the employment share of the state sector results in an increase in urban wage 
inequality.  
 
To investigate the cause of this contradictory result, we extend the MM counterfactual 
decomposition to examine the effect of the change in the state sector employment share on 
urban wage inequality to all decile points of the employment share. We exemplify this 
simulated counterfactual decomposition method by using the 1995 wage structure and 
explanatory variables as the base. In fact, during the period from 1995 to 2002, the employment 
share of the state sector fell from 79% to 65%. However, in the simulated counterfactual 
decomposition the employment share of the state sector in 1995 is kept constant, while 
assuming that the state sector’s employment share can counterfactually be changed to 10%, 
20%, …, 90%. The same kind of counterfactual decomposition is implemented for 1988, 2002 
and 2007.  
 
Table 8 reports the simulation results of the counterfactual decomposition of the effect of 
variation in the state sector’s employment share on urban wage inequality. From Table 8, when 
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the employment share of the state sector is counterfactually changed to 10%, 20%, …, 90% in 
each year, the difference between the counterfactual and factual urban wage inequality (the 
former minus the latter) changes from large to small and also from positive to negative. 
However, because the state sector has different employment shares in each of the four years, 
the transition from positive to negative in the difference between the counterfactual and factual 
urban wage inequalities in each year occurred at different intervals of the counterfactual 
employment shares of the state sector. It can be observed from Table 8 that the intervals of the 
counterfactual employment share of the state sector, in which the difference between the 
counterfactual and factual urban wage inequalities changes from positive to negative, decline 
along with the fall in the factual employment share of the state sector.  
 
In addition, in the simulation of the counterfactual decomposition for each year, when the 
counterfactual employment share of the state sector is higher than the factual one in any 
particular year, the difference between counterfactual and factual urban wage inequality is 
negative. For the simulation results in Table 8, we assumed that the transition of the state 
sector’s employment share is from factual to counterfactual, as in the decomposition results in 
Table 6. If we multiply every simulated number in Table 8 by “–1”, we obtain the simulation 
results in reverse order—the transition of the state sector’s employment share from 
counterfactual to factual, which is consistent with Table 7. Under this reverse order, when the 
state sector’s counterfactual employment share is greater than the factual, urban wage 
inequality increases. Recall that the state sector’s employment share has been decreasing since 
1994. As a result, it is inevitable that contradictory results occur between the simulation results 
computed for the base year and those based on the current year for each of the two periods from 
1995 to 2002 and 2002 to 2007.  
 
In essence, the contradiction between the outcomes of the decomposition of the change in the 
employment share of the state sector versus non-state sector based on the beginning year and 
closing year’s wage structure could be brought about by the difference in the wage structure of 
the beginning year and closing year of a decomposition period. China’s economy and in 
particular her SOE sector had experienced drastic structural transformation in the periods from 
1995 to 2002 and 2002 to 2007. Therefore, there should be fundamental change in the wage 
structure of the beginning year and closing year in each of the two periods. In addition, the MM 
counterfactual decomposition could be regarded as a kind of prediction method. Prediction is 
always made on the base year. Therefore, the MM decomposition of the change in employment 
share of the state sector versus non-state sector should be based on the beginning year’s wage 
structure.  
 
Taken together, whether the fall in the state sector’s employment share leads to any change in 
urban wage inequality depends on the order of the counterfactual decomposition. Viewed as a 
prediction method, the counterfactual decomposition of how the change of employment share 
of state sector affects urban wage inequality should be based on the beginning year’s wage 
structure for any period of interest. Taking this approach, the reduction of the employment 
share of the state sector in the periods from 1995 to 2002 and from 2002 to 2007 results in a 
decrease of urban wage inequality.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Conclusively, the SOEs per se, the sector’s size and determinants of wage structure have been 
transformed considerably since the economic reform and in particular after the radical SOE 
reform of the mid-1990s. At the same time, the income inequality in urban China has 
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drastically increased, for example, the Gini coefficient of  urban wage income rose from 0.24 in 
1988 to 0.44 in 2007 (Table 1). Therefore, a follow-up question is how China’s urban wage 
inequality has been affected by the changes of employment share and determinants of pay 
structure in the SOE sector. 
 
This paper examined the effect of change in the state sector’s wage structure and employment 
share on urban wage inequality by employing CHIP urban household survey data from 1988, 
1995, 2002 and 2007. As our methodology, we employed multiple quantile regressions and 
MM counterfactual decompositions. We also extended the MM counterfactual decompositions 
to all decile points in order to investigate the effect of change in the state sector’s employment 
share on urban wage inequality. The results of the multiple quantile regressions and MM 
counterfactual decomposition revealed that after the radical SOE reform, the fall of 
employment share of SOE sector resulted in a decrease of urban wage inequality, but the wage 
premium of SOE workers and its unreasonable part increased significantly, which in turn led to 
an increase in urban wage inequality. 
 
The state sector consists of the public sector and SOEs. The SOEs’ share of total urban 
employment fell from 50% in 1995 to 18% in 2007, while the public sector’s share remained at 
about 30%. The results of the multiple quantile regressions suggest that pay in the public sector 
was higher than that in SOEs in both 1995 and 2002, but the gap decreased as one moved up the 
wage distribution. In 2007 there were no significant pay differentials between the public sector 
and SOEs, except that the pay in the latter was higher than that in the former for the top 
quintile. This implies that after 2002 there were larger pay rises in SOEs than in the public 
sector. 
 
Before the SOE reforms, SOE managers had few credit constraints, little business risk and 
incentive to raise pay for workers, and the aim of SOEs was not the maximization of profits and 
total wealth, but rather the maximization of the pay and welfare of workers. Therefore, the 
main determinant of wages in SOEs was the amount of retained profit, rather than the 
productivity of the workers. The consequence of this former regime was that the wage 
premium of the state sector versus non-state sector increased considerably in the period from 
1988 to 1995, which caused an increase in urban wage inequality. 
 
During the SOE reform, the wage premium of the state sector was reduced temporarily, leading 
to a fall in urban wage inequality for the period from 1995 to 2002. However, the SOEs that 
survived the reform are large and monopolistic, characterized by opportunistic monopolistic 
profit and payment of high salaries. Therefore, since 2002, the rate of pay rises for SOE 
workers has not only been faster than that of the public sector but has also been faster than that 
of the private sector, which led to an increase in urban wage inequality. The Oaxaca–Blinder 
decomposition showed that the unreasonable part of the wage premium of the state sector 
versus non-state sector remained at about 44% until 2002, but then increased sharply to 81% in 
2007. The monopolistic SOEs were able to set monopolistic prices, earn monopolistic profits 
and pay their employees’ wages that were higher than their marginal product. These might be 
the chief reasons that the wages in SOEs increased faster than did those in the public sector and 
private sector. 
 
More than 30 years has passed since China’s economic reforms were initiated in 1978. During 
these decades, the most spectacular and influential reforms were the abolishment of the 
collective agricultural regime in the early 1980s and the radical SOE reform in the late 1990s, 
which involved the retrenchment of half of all SOE employees and the privatization of the 
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majority of SOEs. The rural reform, which returned collectivized land to rural households, 
resulted in a large rise in agricultural output and a significant fall in rural poverty. It can be 
regarded as a pure Pareto improvement—there were no losers during the reform. However, the 
radical SOE reform led to the retrenchment of half of the SOE workforce and a massive 
reduction in the number of SOEs. The SOE reforms eliminated the need for the majority of 
state fiscal income to be spent on subsidizing loss-making SOEs, and hence laid a solid 
financial foundation for the new Hu–Wen deal that focused on improving household living 
conditions.17 
 
China’s transitional market economy is still not perfect. The large monopolistic SOEs play a 
dominant role and pay their employees very high salaries and welfare payments, which has 
contributed to the rise in urban wage inequality. For this reason, decision makers should put 
more effort into monitoring and regulating monopolistic SOEs.  
 
The results of the multiple quantile regressions suggest that pay in the public sector was higher 
than that in SOEs in both 1995 and 2002, but the gap decreased as the wage levels increase in 
each of the two years. In 2007 there were no significant pay differentials between the public 
sector and SOEs, except that the pay in the latter was higher than that in the former for the top 
quintile. This implies that after 2002 there were larger pay rises in SOEs than in the public 
sector. 
 
Before the state sector reforms, SOE managers had few credit constraints, little business risk 
and incentive to raise pay for workers, and the aim of SOEs was not the maximization of profits 
and total wealth, but rather the maximization of the pay and welfare of workers. Therefore, the 
main determinant of wages in SOEs was the amount of retained profit, rather than the 
productivity of the workers. The consequence of this former regime was that the wage 
premium of the state sector versus non-state sector increased considerably in the period from 
1988 to 1995, which caused an increase in urban wage inequality. 
 
During the SOE reform, the wage premium of the state sector was reduced temporarily, leading 
to a fall in urban wage inequality for the period from 1995 to 2002. However, the SOEs that 
survived the reform are large and monopolistic, characterized by opportunistic monopolistic 
profit and payment of high salaries. Therefore, since 2002, the rate of pay rises for SOE 
workers has not only been faster than that of the public sector but has also been faster than that 
of the private sector, which led to an increase in urban wage inequality. The Oaxaca–Blinder 
decomposition showed that the unreasonable part of the wage premium of the state sector 
versus non-state sector remained at about 44% until 2002, but then increased sharply to 81% in 
2007. The monopolistic SOEs were able to set monopolistic prices, earn monopolistic profits 
and pay their employees’ wages that were higher than their marginal product. These might be 
the chief reasons that the wages in SOEs increased faster than did those in the public sector and 
private sector. 
 
We also extended the MM counterfactual decompositions to all decile points in order to 
investigate the effect of change in the state sector’s employment share on urban wage 
inequality. The state sector consists of the public sector and SOEs. The SOEs’ share of total 
urban employment fell from 50% in 1995 to 18% in 2007, while the public sector’s share 
remained at about 30%. The results of the multiple quantile regressions and MM counterfactual 
decomposition revealed that after the radical SOE reform, the fall of employment share of SOE 
                                                        
17 The Hu–Wen new deal is referred to as Hu Jingtao and Wen Jiabao’s policy because it came into effect since 2002.  
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sector resulted in a decrease of urban wage inequality, but the wage premium of SOE workers 
and its unreasonable part increased significantly, which in turn led to an increase in urban wage 
inequality. 
 
More than 30 years has passed since China’s economic reforms were initiated in 1978. During 
these decades, the most spectacular and influential reforms were the abolishment of the 
collective agricultural regime in the early 1980s and the radical SOE reform in the late 1990s, 
which involved the retrenchment of half of all SOE employees and the privatization of the 
majority of SOEs. The rural reform, which returned collectivized land to rural households, 
resulted in a large rise in agricultural output and a significant fall in rural poverty. Therefore, it 
was a pure Pareto improvement—there were no losers during the reform. However, the radical 
SOE reform led to the retrenchment of half of the SOE workforce and a massive reduction in 
the number of SOEs. The SOE reforms eliminated the need for the majority of state fiscal 
income to be spent on subsidizing loss-making SOEs, and hence laid a solid financial 
foundation for the new Hu–Wen deal that focused on improving household living conditions.18 
 
China’s transitional market economy is still not perfect. The large monopolistic SOEs play a 
dominant role and pay their employees very high salaries and welfare payments without much 
of justification, which have led to the rise in urban wage inequality. For this reason, decision 
makers should put more effort into monitoring and regulating monopolistic SOEs.  
                                                        
18 The Hu–Wen new deal is referred to as Hu Jingtao and Wen Jiabao’s policy because it came into effect since 2002.  
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Table 1: Indicators of wage inequality of urban China 
 
 
 
Source: CHIP 1988, 1995, 2002 and 2007 urban household survey. 
When only relative values are involved, wages are in nominal price; whereas when absolute values are 
needed, wages of other years are all adjusted to the 2002 constant prices according to the urban consumer 
price index of China Statistical Yearbooks of various years.  
 1988 1995 2002 2007 
Gini coefficients 0.23720 0.34449 0.34781 0.43937 
General entropy     
GE(-1)                    0.23790 0.57580 0.28577 0.40476                
GE(0) 0.10786 0.23536 0.21241 0.33339 
GE(1) 0.10766 0.22646 0.21514 0.44610 
GE(2) 0.14837 0.37869 0.29688 1.97441 
Atkinson index     
A(0.5)               0.05124 0.10560 0.10053 0.16938          
A(1)   0.10224 0.20971 0.19137 0.28351 
A(2) 0.32240 0.53523 0.36368 0.44737 
Mean 17.60 28.20 49.73 98.54 
Median 16.53 23.99 41.83 69.24 
Standard deviation 9.41 24.61 38.32 198.31 
Ratios of wages  of percentile points 
p90/p10 2.82                      5.04                      4.96                      6.43                    
p75/p25 1.65 2.17 2.29 2.80 
p90/p50 1.57 1.99 2.08 2.57 
P50/p10 1.80 2.54 2.38 2.50 
Skewness 7.16 11.09 4.32 32.64 
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Table 2: Indicators of wage inequality and gap of urban China by ownership sector 
 
 
 
Source: CHIP 1988, 1995, 2002 and 2007 urban household survey. 
When only relative values are involved, wages are in nominal price; whereas when absolute values are 
needed, wages of other years are all adjusted to the 2002 constant prices according to the urban consumer 
price index of China Statistical Yearbooks of various years.  
 
 1988 1995 2002 2007 
 state Non-state state Non-state state Non-state state Non-state 
Gini 
coefficients 0.221  0.278  0.326  0.396  0.314  0.392  0.392  0.481  
General entropy  
GE(-1)                    0.135  0.515  0.452  0.870  0.228  0.343  0.321  0.471  
GE(0) 0.092  0.149  0.206  0.314  0.174  0.264  0.265  0.397  
GE(1) 0.095  0.144  0.206  0.295  0.174  0.290  0.326  0.577  
GE(2) 0.136  0.188  0.351  0.486  0.224  0.476  1.013  3.181  
Atkinson index 
A(0.5)               0.045  0.069  0.095  0.137  0.083  0.128  0.133  0.205  
A(1)   0.088  0.139  0.186  0.270  0.160  0.232  0.233  0.328  
A(2) 0.213  0.508  0.475  0.635  0.313  0.407  0.391  0.485  
Mean 18.36 14.98 29.828 22.05 53.83 42.19 104.55 92.57 
Median 17.35 13.68 25.44 17.95 47.66 31.82 79.99 59.59 
Standard 
deviation 9.45 8.78 25.088 21.65 36.01 41.19 151.41 235.70 
Ratios of wages of percentile points 
p90/p10 2.59 3.43 4.35 6.71 4.30 5.45 5.64 6.90 
p75/p25 1.57 1.79 2.03 2.46 2.02 2.36 2.50 2.83 
p90/p50 1.52 1.71 1.92 2.25 1.91 2.46 2.28 2.80 
P50/p100 1.70 2.01 2.26 2.99 2.25 2.22 2.47 2.46 
Skewness 8.20 3.79 11.90 7.63 3.59 5.60 26.886 31.719 
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Table 3: Indicators of wage inequality and gap of urban China by subsectors 
 1988 1995 2002 2007 
 Publ
ic 
secto
r 
SO
Es 
Collecti
ve 
firms 
Priva
te 
firms 
Forei
gn 
firms 
Othe
rs 
Publ
ic 
secto
r 
SO
Es 
Collecti
ve 
firms 
Priva
te 
firms 
Forei
gn 
firms 
Othe
rs 
Publ
ic 
secto
r 
SO
Es 
Collecti
ve 
firms 
Priva
te 
firms 
Forei
gn 
firms 
Othe
rs 
Publ
ic 
secto
r 
SOE
s 
Collecti
ve 
firms 
Priva
te 
firms 
Forei
gn 
firms 
Othe
rs 
Mean 18.36  14.82 
18.0
8 24.67 
12.0
3 
32.8
7 
28.0
3 21.10 
18.0
5 34.38 
19.5
0 
59.2
2 
48.9
1 34.71 
42.5
1 67.03 
40.4
7 
106.
48 
101.
13 89.97 
88.8
9 
125.1
3 
65.0
6 
Median 
 
17.3
5  13.77 
11.5
9 22.98 
10.5
5 
28.1
9 
23.5
3 17.63 
12.8
2 28.23 
16.6
6 
53.2
3 
41.1
2 28.00 
31.8
7 54.97 
30.0
3 
82.8
5 
71.9
9 58.49 
55.8
7 86.30 
46.1
4 
Standar
d 
deviati
on 
9.45  7.78 19.22 15.75 8.90 
23.7
5 
25.8
6 20.20 
17.5
0 28.75 
17.6
9 
34.6
4 
36.5
3 24.63 
42.7
3 50.46 
43.8
6 
101.
19 
212.
97 266.03 
252.
95 
157.7
3 
72.3
6 
Gini 
index 
 
0.22
1  0.255 
0.47
4 0.369 
0.40
2 
0.30
2 
0.33
8 0.372 
0.45
2 0.362 
0.44
8 
0.28
7 
0.33
1 0.336 
0.38
6 0.351 
0.39
9 
0.37
9 
0.41
4 0.463 
0.48
9 0.436 
0.40
5 
Ratios of wages on various percentile points 
p90/p1
0 
 
2.59  3.09 11.89 7.79 
13.7
8 3.61 4.73 5.68 9.34 5.40 
19.9
5 3.79 4.37 4.37 5.36 5.03 5.36 5.88 5.00 5.25 7.00 7.00 6.00 
p75/p2
5 
 
1.57  1.73 3.17 2.65 2.91 1.81 2.15 2.25 2.88 2.21 4.22 1.83 2.14 2.17 2.30 2.52 2.50 2.46 2.45 2.39 2.67 2.80 2.25 
p90/p5
0 
 
1.52  1.64 3.23 2.19 2.39 1.89 2.00 2.17 2.94 2.12 2.39 1.80 2.03 2.23 2.41 2.22 2.39 2.40 2.29 2.50 3.00 2.92 2.68 
P50/p1
0 
 
1.70  1.89 3.68 3.56 5.75 1.92 2.36 2.62 3.17 2.54 8.33 2.10 2.15 1.96 2.22 2.27 2.24 2.45 2.19 2.10 2.33 2.40 2.24 
Skewn
ess 
 
8.20  3.46 3.41 0.68 1.03 5.90 14.61 9.26 2.54 3.65 2.57 2.47 4.69 2.68 5.69 3.75 6.41 6.99 
25.4
7 17.83 
33.7
0 9.05 5.54 
 
 
 
Source: CHIP 1988, 1995, 2002 and 2007 urban household survey. 
When only relative values are involved, wages are in nominal price; whereas when absolute values are needed, wages of other years are all adjusted to the 2002 constant 
prices according to the urban consumer price index of China Statistical Yearbooks of various years. 
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Table 4: Ownership structure of the employed urban workers 
 
 
 
Source: CHIP 1988, 1995, 2002 and 2007 urban household surveys. 
  
 1988 1995 2002 2007 
No. of observations 17,733 12,245 10,133 6,938 
Ownership structure of the employed urban workers (%) 
State sector 77.67 79.04 64.76 49.83 
Public service sector  29.66 30.90 31.82 
SOEs  50.95 33.86 18.00 
Urban collective firms 20.28 15.06 6.86 5.36 
Private firms 0.77 1.65 20.72 34.48 
Foreign-owned and joint-venture firms 0.36 1.27 2.17 7.08 
Other ownerships 0.92 2.98 5.49 3.26 
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Table 5: Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition of pay differential between the state and non-state sectors 
 
 
 
Source: CHIP 1988, 1995, 2002 and 2007 urban household survey. 
Wages of other years are all adjusted to the 2002 constant prices according to the urban consumer price index 
of China Statistical Yearbooks of various years. 
U = unexplained portion of differential (difference between model constants). 
D = portion due to discrimination (C+U).  
 1988 1995 2002 2007 
Amount attributable: 1.0 5.6 33.9 24.8 
- due to endowments (E): 14.5 23.1 18.5 4.9 
- due to coefficients (C): -13.4 -17.5 15.4 19.9 
Shift coefficient (U): 24.5 34.9 -0.6 0.6 
Raw differential (R) {E+C+U}: 25.5 40.5 33.3 25.4 
Adjusted differential (D) {C+U}: 11.1 17.4 14.8 20.6 
Endowments as % total (E/R): 56.7 57.0 55.6 19.2 
Discrimination as % total (D/R): 43.3 43.0 44.4 80.8 
 28 
Table 6 
MM counterfactual decomposition of the effect of wage structure and employment share of state 
sector versus non-state sector on urban wage inequality based on the beginning year’s wage structure 
 
 
 
Source: CHIP 1988, 1995, 2002 and 2007 urban household surveys. 
Note: The decompositions are based on the beginning year’s wage structure and explanatory variables for the 
periods from 1988 to 1995, 1995 to 2002, and 2002 to 2007. 
 Change of coefficients Change of covariates 
 1988-1995 1995-2002 2002-2007 1988-1995 1995-2002 2002-2007 
Gini 
0.007 
(.005, .009) 
(+10) 
-0.012 
(-.014, -.007) 
(+0) 
0.003 
(.003, .004) 
(+10) 
-0.001 
(-.005, .002) 
(+1) 
-0.001 
(-.006, .002) 
(+5) 
0.000 
(-.003, .002) 
(+7) 
Mean 
1.44 
(1.36, 1.52) 
(+10) 
-2.60 
(-2.75, -2.48) 
(+0) 
0.96 
(0.92, 1.02) 
(+10) 
-0.01 
(-0.05, 0.02) 
(+4) 
-0.95 
(-1.16, -0.79) 
(+0) 
-0.95 
(-1.13, -0.79) 
(+0) 
Median 
1.30 
(1.07, 1.48) 
(+10) 
-1.78 
(-2.10, -1.47) 
(+0) 
0.55 
(0.10, 0.95) 
(+10) 
0.00 
(-0.20, 0.10) 
(+6) 
-0.85 
(-1.08, -0.47) 
(+0) 
-1.14 
(-1.87, -0.44) 
(+0) 
Standard 
deviation 
1.18 
(0.69, 2.60) 
(+10) 
-4.07 
(-8.11, -2.14) 
(+0) 
0.53 
(-0.48, 1.10) 
(+8) 
-0.04 
(-0.18, 0.05) 
(+3) 
-0.97 
(-2.43, -0.23) 
(+0) 
-0.29 
(-1.61, 0.41) 
(+3) 
Skewness 
0.74 
(-0.54, 4.43) 
(+7) 
-1.94 
(-7.34, 0.30) 
(+1) 
-0.32 
(-1.06, 0.12) 
(+2) 
0.03 
(-0.15, 0.30) 
(+6) 
-0.33 
(-1.88, 0.43) 
(+4) 
0.20 
(-0.68, 0.71) 
(+9) 
P90/P10 
0.13 
(0.06, 0.18) 
(+10) 
-0.11 
(-0.34, 0.09) 
(+1) 
0.11 
(0.04, 0.18) 
(+10) 
-0.02 
(-0.06, 0.02) 
(+3) 
-0.09 
(-0.31, 0.09) 
(+1) 
-0.09 
(-0.21, 0.22) 
(+1) 
P75/P25 
0.04 
(0.01, 0.05) 
(+10) 
-0.06 
(-0.08, 0.00) 
(+0) 
0.05 
(0.02, 0.09) 
(+10) 
-0.01 
(-0.04, 0.01) 
(+1) 
0.01 
(-0.06, 0.07) 
(+5) 
-0.03 
(-0.09, 0.02) 
(+3) 
P90/P50 
0.02 
(-0.01, 0.05) 
(+9) 
-0.05 
(-0.08, 0.01) 
(+1) 
0.04 
(0.00, 0.06) 
(+10) 
-0.01 
(-0.03, 0.00) 
(+1) 
-0.01 
(-0.06, 0.03) 
(+4) 
0.02 
(-0.04, 0.05) 
(+8) 
P50/P10 
0.06 
(0.01, 0.09) 
(+10) 
0.01 
(-0.09, 0.13) 
(+6) 
0.01 
(-0.04, 0.04) 
(+6) 
0.00 
(-0.03, 0.03) 
(+5) 
-0.04 
(-0.15, 0.04) 
(+3) 
-0.06 
(-0.13, 0.08) 
(+1) 
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Table 7： 
MM counterfactual decomposition of the effect of wage structure and employment share of state 
sector versus non-state sector on urban wage inequality based on the closing year’s wage structure 
 
 
Source: CHIP 1988, 1995, 2002 and 2007 urban household survey. 
The decompositions are based on the closing year’s wage structure and explanatory variables for the periods 
from 1988 to 1995, 1995 to 2002, and 2002 to 2007. 
 Change of coefficients Change of covariates 
 1988-1995 1995-2002 2002-2007 1988-1995 1995-2002 2002-2007 
Gini 
0.003 
(0.001, 0.005) 
(+10) 
-0.014 
(-0.015, -0.009) 
(+0) 
0.002 
(0.001, 0.003) 
(+10) 
-0.001 
(-0.003, 0.002) 
(+4) 
0.007 
(0.005, 0.01) 
(+10) 
0.008 
(-0.001, 0.023) 
(+9) 
Mean 
2.14 
(2.07, 2.28) 
(+10) 
-4.55 
(-4.96, -4.14) 
(+0) 
1.37 
(1.22, 1.51) 
(+10) 
-0.15 
(-0.26, -0.05) 
(+0) 
-0.55 
(-0.73, -0.31) 
(+0) 
-0.85 
(-2.05, 1.85) 
(+2) 
Median 
1.84 
(1.59, 2.09) 
(+10) 
-2.88 
(-3.38, -2.07) 
(+0) 
0.73 
(-0.25, 1.80) 
(+9) 
-0.24 
(-0.86, 0.09) 
(+2) 
-0.77 
(-1.50, -0.21) 
(+0) 
-1.19 
(-2.31, -0.06) 
(+0) 
Standard 
deviation 
2.13 
(1.27, 3.54) 
(+10) 
-8.48 
(-18.70, -3.90) 
(+0) 
0.54 
(-0.33, 2.30) 
(+8) 
0.10 
(-0.23, 0.68) 
(+4) 
0.54 
(-0.29, 1.64) 
(+7) 
15.45 
(-12.36, 109.29) 
(+7) 
Skewness 
0.44 
(-0.15, 2.79) 
(+8) 
-1.23 
(-4.59, 0.41) 
(+3) 
-0.16 
(-0.45, 0.35) 
(+2) 
0.10 
(-0.29, 0.28) 
(+9) 
0.08 
(-0.31, 0.75) 
(+4) 
0.52 
(-1.86, 3.99) 
(+5) 
P90/P10 
0.14 
(-0.02, 0.29) 
(+9) 
-0.26 
(-0.36, -0.13) 
(+0) 
0.13 
(-0.07, 0.25 ) 
(+8) 
0.08 
(-0.20, 0.23) 
(+7) 
0.27 
(0.11 0.48) 
(+10) 
0.11 
(-0.21, 0.36) 
(+7) 
P75/P25 
0.05 
(0.00, 0.08) 
(+10) 
-0.06 
(-0.10, -0.02) 
(+0) 
0.05 
(0.01, 0.08) 
(+10) 
0.02 
(-0.04, 0.07) 
(+8) 
0.08 
(0.04, 0.17) 
(+10) 
0.03 
(-0.02, 0.08) 
(+8) 
P90/P50 
0.00 
(-0.04, 0.03) 
(+8) 
-0.07 
(-0.13, -0.02) 
(+0) 
0.03 
(-0.02, 0.09) 
(+7) 
0.00 
(-0.05, 0.06) 
(+6) 
0.04 
(0.00, 0.08) 
(+10) 
0.01 
(-0.06, 0.07) 
(+5) 
P50/P10 
0.06 
(-0.01, 0.11) 
(+9) 
-0.04 
(-0.10, 0.01) 
(+0) 
0.02 
(-0.06, 0.06) 
(+8) 
0.04 
(-0.08, 0.13) 
(+8) 
0.08 
(0.03, 0.17) 
(+10) 
0.03 
(-0.06, 0.11) 
(+7) 
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Table 8:  
MM counterfactual decomposition of the effect of state sector’ employment share  
on urban wage inequality 
 
Table 8a: based on 1988’s wage structure and other explanatory variables 
 Gini 90th/10th 75th/25th 90th/50th 50th/10th 
77% to 10% 0.008 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.01 
77% to 20% 0.008 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.01 
77% to 30% 0.006 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.01 
77% to 40% 0.004 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 
77% to 50% 0.003 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 
77% to 60% 0.001 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 
77% to 65% -0.001 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
77% to 70% 0.001 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 
77% to 75% -0.001 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
77% to 80% -0.003 -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 
77% to 85% -0.003 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
77% to 90% -0.004 -0.08 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 
 
Table 8b: based on 1995’s wage structure and other explanatory variables 
 Gini 90th/10th 75th/25th 90th/50th 50th/10th 
79% to 10% 0.005 0.12 0.00 0.03 0.02 
79% to 20% 0.009 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.00 
79% to 30% 0.004 0.09 0.02 0.04 -0.01 
79% to 40% 0.006 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 
79% to 50% 0.004 0.19 0.02 0.03 0.06 
79% to 60% 0.004 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.00 
79% to 65% -0.001 -0.09 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 
79% to 70% 0.001 -0.05 0.01 0.02 -0.05 
79% to 75% -0.003 -0.12 0.00 0.00 -0.06 
79% to 85% -0.006 -0.09 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
79% to 90% -0.004 -0.18 -0.05 -0.01 -0.07 
 
Table 8c: based on 2002’s wage structure and other explanatory variables 
 Gini 90th/10th 75th/25th 90th/50th 50th/10th 
65% to 10% 0.010 0.10 0.02 0.07 -0.03 
65% to 20% 0.008 -0.02 -0.02 0.06 -0.07 
65% to 30% 0.004 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 
65% to 40% 0.004 0.02 -0.02 0.06 -0.05 
65% to 45% 0.001 -0.11 -0.01 0.01 -0.06 
65% to 50% -0.002 -0.11 -0.02 0.02 -0.07 
65% to 55% -0.001 -0.08 -0.04 0.04 -0.08 
65% to 60% -0.002 -0.10 -0.04 0.01 -0.06 
65% to 70% -0.004 -0.13 -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 
65% to 75% -0.003 -0.15 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 
65% to 80% -0.005 -0.21 -0.05 -0.01 -0.09 
65% to 85% -0.008 -0.21 -0.07 -0.04 -0.06 
65% to 90%  -0.011 -0.25 -0.08 -0.04 -0.08 
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Table 8d: based on 2007’s wage structure and other explanatory variables 
 Gini 90th/10th 75th/25th 90th/50th 50th/10th 
10% to 50% -0.011 0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.03 
20% to 50% -0.008 0.08 0.01 -0.01 0.04 
30% to 50% -0.002 0.15 0.04 0.01 0.05 
35% to 50% 0.002 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.04 
40% to 50% 0.003 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 
45% to 50% -0.003 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 
55% to 50% 0.007 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.01 
60% to 50% 0.004 0.24 0.07 0.04 0.05 
65% to 50% 0.008 0.11 0.03 0.01 0.03 
70% to 50% 0.007 0.21 0.06 0.04 0.04 
75% to 50% 0.012 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.02 
80% to 50% 0.009 0.20 0.05 0.06 0.02 
85% to 50% 0.013 0.24 0.07 0.07 0.03 
90% to 50% 0.019 0.30 0.09 0.08 0.04 
 
Source: CHIP 1988, 1995, 2002 and 2007 urban household surveys. 
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Figure 1. Lorenz Curve of Wages in Urban China: 1988-2007 
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Figure 2. State to Non-State Daily-Wage Gap 
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Figure 3. Public Services-SOEs wage gap 
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Figure 4. State and non-State Sector Wage Premium 88-07 
